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Introduction 
 
Throughout the year 2011
1
 the right to freedom of assembly has been on the agenda: pro-
democracy movement described as the “Arab spring” has effected Libya, Egypt, Syria and at 
least 14 other countries
2
 in the region; in Europe the Greeks protested against austerity 
measures
3
, the Spanish against the government
4
 and several cities hosted the “Slut Walks” 
against sexual assault,
5
 starting from the USA, the “people‟s assembly” against unfair global 
economy called “Occupy Wall Street” inspired by the “Arab spring” has spread to actions in 
1500 cities globally.
6
  
 
Therefore it could not have been more timely when on the 1
st
 of May 2011 the newly 
appointed United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur (SR) on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
                                                 
1
 The following paper is written based on the status of the data and information available as of 
15 November 2011.  
2
 Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen. In: Middle East Protest Interactive Timeline. 
3
 Thousands protest against Greek austerity (2011).  
4
 Mass Spanish protests continue into polling day (2011).  
5
 “Slut Walk” hits London (2011).  
6
 Occupy Wall Street webpage (2011).  
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assembly and association took up his functions.
7
 This is the first time the UN has appointed a 
SR for the right to freedom of assembly.
8
 
 
Paradoxically, the right to freedom of assembly has not deserved much attention from the 
legal research.
9
 There is found literature by sociologists who tackle the questions of why 
people protest, how resistance movements have changed the societies, and what is the role of 
gatherings of people.
10
 Although context-wise important for legal scholars as well, that 
material should not aim to substitute legal research. John D. Inazu has rightly called the right 
to freedom of assembly “forgotten”11, and Margaret M. Russell regretted “[…] it has simply 
fallen from public, scholarly, and judicial attention”.12 
 
The following paper will use the tepid academic interest and the social importance of the right 
to freedom of assembly as a departure point. Thus, the first aim of the paper is to fill the gap in 
the legal research of the freedom of assembly and through this hopefully provoke and inspire 
others to follow. Naturally, it is not possible to address all the problems and gaps with one 
paper. Therefore, this paper will have its focus in the following.  
                                                 
7
 Maina Kiai biography, UN Human Rights. SR‟s mandate was established with HR Council‟s 
Resolution. See: A/HRC/RES/15/21, 6 October 2011, point 5.  
8
 With the resolution 1993/45 of the (then) UN Commission on Human Rights the mandate of 
the SR on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression was 
established (see point 11 of the resolution). Although the resolution was mindful of the right to 
freedom of assembly as well as an “intrinsically linked right”(see points 2, 7), the focus of this 
SR has not been the right to freedom of assembly.  
9
 There have been books published quite recently on the topic such. See Mead (2010) and The 
First Amendment: Freedom of Assembly and Petition. Its Constitutional History and the 
Contemporary Debate (2010), but they are rather country-specific, or do not analyse the recent 
developments of the right. Overall the literature is scarce. As D. Mead writes: “It is hard to 
count the numbers of books in the Anglo-Commonwealth world dedicated to the topic of free 
speech. Those on the topic of protest and assembly would probably not utilize the fingers of 
both hands.” In: Mead (2010) p.6.  
10
 See e.g. The Social Movements Reader. Cases and Concepts (2009).  
11
 Inazu (2010).  
12
 The First Amendment: Freedom of Assembly and Petition. Its Constitutional History and the 
Contemporary Debate (2010) p. 21.  
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The author of this paper would propose that there are two principles that define human rights 
law. First, at the end of the day, the implementation of human rights takes place on the 
domestic level and, secondly, it is the defining factor whether the international standards of 
human rights law find their way into the domestic regulations or not. Just as the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has summarised: ”It is also clear that the primary 
responsibility for implementing human rights lies with Governments. It is through action at the 
national level that international human rights obligations can be translated into reality.”13 
 
Thus, the second and main aim of the paper is to answer the research question: “How are the 
domestic regulations of the selected countries in Europe able to address the potential problems 
and developments of the right to freedom of assembly in the light of the international standard 
of the right?”.  
 
As noted, it would not be sensible nor possible to cover all the legally relevant and under-
discussed questions about the right to freedom of assembly with the paper at hand. However, 
the author of this paper would argue that the research question chosen is fundamental and of 
great relevance. Firstly, because this investigation into international standard will offer 
analysis of all the relevant international and regional instruments in the light of one context. 
Secondly, in order to define the international standard for the right to freedom of assembly it 
will be necessary to define the right to freedom of assembly itself which is a valuable 
contribution to all further works on the topic. Thirdly, this research question demands not only 
an analysis of the problematic aspects of regulating the right to freedom of assembly, but also 
an overview of the most recent developments of the right. And fourthly, this question will 
allow us to at least scratch the surface of how one region in the world is able to address that 
standard.  
 
To answer that research question, the paper will be divided into three chapters.  
                                                 
13
 UN doc. A/59/2005/Add.3, para. 22. 
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Chapter 1 will define the object of this paper by asking: “What is the right to freedom of 
assembly?”. By defining we will mean analysing the elements, limits and essence of the right 
to freedom of assembly. The author of this paper would like to emphasize that Chapter 1 will 
aim at finding a model definition of the right to freedom of assembly in general, abstract 
manner without adding any country-specific context to the final result. Under this chapter, 
first, the interplay of and relationship with the right to freedom of assembly and other rights 
will be discussed. It will be seen if and how the separate right to freedom of assembly is 
argued for. This will be done by analysing the right to freedom of assembly also in the United 
States of America under the First Amendment doctrine. The reason the thesis will also look at 
the USA is that by raising the questions about treating the right to freedom of assembly as 
separate from the freedom of speech, the USA offers an interesting comparative context. 
Further, the second half of the Chapter 1 will investigate what are the essential elements of the 
right to freedom of assembly. Through analysing the elements of intent, agenda/content, 
temporariness, group, public forum and act/conduct, a model definition and understanding of 
the right to freedom of assembly emerges. The conclusion of Chapter 1 offers an illustrative 
model graph that summarises the definition proposed by the author.  
  
Chapter 2 will first provide what is the international standard in general, what kind of sources 
are entailed in it, and secondly, what is the international standard for the specific selected 
problems and developments of the right to freedom of assembly. The search for the 
international standard will be based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)
14
, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
15
, Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
16
 and the OSCE/ODIHR 
                                                 
14
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966). 999 UNTS 171.  
15
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217 
A(III) of 10 December 1948). 
16
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 1950. 
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Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2
nd
 ed. 2010 (Guidelines [2010])
17
 as the latter 
are being the most recent, holistic and comprehensive source for the right to freedom of 
assembly.  The Guidelines (2010) are not legally binding and hold a descriptive nature rather 
than prescriptive. Guidelines (2010) provide: “[…]the Guidelines do not attempt to provide  
ready-made solutions but, rather, to clarify key issues and discuss possible ways to address 
them.”, and “They [Guidelines] demarcate parameters for implementation consistent with 
international standards and illustrate key principles with examples of good practice from 
individual states”.18 
 
In addition, the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECourtHR) and 
UN Human Rights Committee (UN HRC) will be used. The focus of Chapter 2 is 
international standard, but as the research question investigates Europe, regional standard is 
analysed within by including the Guidelines (2010) and the ECHR into the standard.   
 
Chapter 3 as the last chapter will bind the pieces of the analysis together and offer an answer 
to the main research question. For that, the domestic assembly regulations of five selected 
countries will be analysed in the context of the international standard. Simply put, it will be 
seen whether the domestic regulations of these countries meet the international standard in the 
four chosen aspects: the subjects of the right, the possibility to hold a spontaneous assembly, 
the requirement of peacefulness and ability to protect the new forms of assemblies. The 
countries selected for the research are: Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Russia, Sweden. This 
choice is based on the development and different level of democracy of the countries. The 
selection is narrowed to countries sharing one regional human rights document – the ECHR– 
as this allows to make general conclusions and the newest legal source on assembly – 
Guidelines (2010) – would not be as relevant elsewhere.  
 
                                                 
17
 OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2
nd
 ed. 2010. 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/73405 [Visited 2 September 2011]. 
18
 Guidelines (2010), p. 10.  
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The author of this paper would like to note that due to the restricted scope of this paper, it will 
and could not be the aim of the research to cover all the aspects of the right to freedom of 
assembly or more specifically, all the possible problems with the domestic regulation of the 
selected countries in the context of the international standard. Thus, the case-law of those 
countries will not be analysed. Rather, as explained, a choice of approach and tackled issues 
will be made.  
 
The nature of this paper and the research question proposed require the author to adopt two 
complementary methods of research. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 will be based on the critical 
analysis of different sources available. As the material on the right to freedom of assembly is 
quite scarce, and, especially, as the newest developments of the right have not been addressed 
in academic literature, the paper could not be limited to primary legal sources and scholarly 
writings only. Thus, in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 relevant information from online media 
sources in addition to sources of law, books and articles has been used.
19
 In Chapter 3 the 
author of this paper has created a more specific method. As noted, four aspects of the domestic 
regulations of the five chosen countries will be discussed and summarised in a form of 
comparative table and graphs. The method used in Chapter 3 will be introduced more 
thoroughly in the relevant chapter. 
                                                 
19
 Full references to online sources can be found in the References of this paper.  
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1 What is the Right to Freedom of Assembly? A Model Definition 
1.1 Problem setting  
 
Before any further analysis based on the right to freedom of assembly
20
 can be conducted, it is 
necessary to grapple what the right to freedom of assembly in fact is. Specifically, what are the 
(unique) elements that define and separate the right from other human rights. Because some 
civil and political rights are at times so closely connected that we might struggle when 
pinpointing one from the other, or explaining the need to separate them. The ECourtHR has 
also acknowledged
21
 the close links between freedom of association and freedom of assembly 
(ECHR Article 11), freedom of thought, conscience and religion (ECHR Article 9), and the 
freedom of expression of Article (ECHR Article 10).
22
  
 
The fact that different human rights (and their protection) overlap at times is not problematic, 
but rather inevitable and thus, normal. However, although every individual right can fuel 
                                                 
20
 When researching the right to freedom of assembly, one encounters many other terms that 
aspire to address if not the same, then similar phenomenon. Some examples are “right of 
public meeting”, “symbolic speech”, “speech plus conduct”, “right to protest” etc. This paper 
will use principally the “right to freedom of assembly” because first, all human rights are 
rights of freedom (See: Bielefeldt [2009], p. 6), and secondly, the word “assembly” should be 
preferred, as it is more general than e.g “meeting”, and can thus be applied to different types 
of assemblies.  
21
 Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (2006) p. 818. 
22
 See e.g.: Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom (1981), para. 57. Refah Partisi 
(Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (2003), para. 87, Freedom and Democracy Party 
(ÖZDEP) v. Turkey (1999), para. 37, Ezelin v. France (1991), para. 37.  
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hesitation with questions about its scope and definition (as almost every aspect in the field of 
law), it is largely straightforward what and we aim to protect with the right to freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, freedom for education, but we struggle far more when we try to 
explain what the right to freedom of assembly is about: how many people are required for 
assembly? Is holding a banner/poster an assembly or just freedom of speech? When people 
“gather” online on the Internet, is that an assembly? Answering to these questions is far more 
difficult than we would (like to) assume because with every question we encounter more and 
more exceptions. Thus, it would be the argument of this paper that a general point of 
departure, a model to operate with would not only serve this thesis, but also any further 
research and above all – the practice and protection of the right to freedom of assembly. 
 
Jarrett and Mund have written:” […] the act of people assembling developed early in the 
history of man. It was a natural thing for men, as social beings, to gather together and 
discourse with one another.”23 The author of this paper would argue that the question of 
justifying the existence of the right to freedom of assembly is not a question of only and pure 
academic interest as many would claim. Rather, answering that is the foundation of the whole 
right‟s protection. As D. Mead so succinctly writes: “ Knowing the basis on which it is being 
asserted that […] a particular protest are good things is important, as it means that any 
restrictions imposed must confront and deal with those assertions.
24
 Thus, the author of this 
paper would develop that in other words, if we cannot justify the existence of something, we 
will struggle advocating its protection.  
  
                                                 
23
 Jarrett (1931), pp. 4-5.  
24
 Mead (2010) p. 7.  
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1.2 What defines the Right to Freedom of Assembly?  
1.2.1 Separating the Right to Freedom of Assembly from the Right to Freedom of 
Speech  
 
In Europe and in the context of international human rights law we operate with legal sources 
that entail the provisions of the right to freedom of assembly, and we tend not to question the 
need for, or justification of those provisions. Article 21 ICCPR provides: “The right of 
peaceful assembly shall be recognized […].” The corresponding article of ECHR is Article 11. 
It provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of assembly […]”. The exact same wording is 
also found in UDHR Article 20 (1).  
 
What connects all three provisions, is the laconic and non-descriptive wording of them. As can 
be drawn from the preparatory works of ICCPR and ECHR, leaving the provisions general 
was the intention and wish of the majority of drafters.
25
 This can be seen as a safe approach 
that grounds the risk of undermining the protection of the right with a too narrow definition. 
However, it would be the view of the author of this paper that a definition that would not try to 
list different forms of assemblies, but would rather incorporate the essential elements of an 
assembly, could be very beneficial for providing a solid definition of the right to freedom of 
assembly.  
 
It seems as if the right to freedom of assembly just “has been and is there”. Nevertheless,  
some doubt can be traced down when reading the writings of a British jurist Dr. A. V. Dicey.
26
 
He wrote the following:  “[…] so it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of such 
                                                 
25
 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory work on Article 11 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, Strasbourg 16 August 1956, p. 13. 
26
 Dicey (1915).  
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thing as any specific right of public meeting […]”.27 And continued: “The right of assembling 
is nothing more than a result of the view taken by the Courts as to individual liberty of person 
and individual liberty of speech.”28 Dicey proposes an example to illustrate his argument. He 
states that person A just has a right to go “where he pleases so that he does not commit 
trespass”29, and to say to person B “what he likes so that his talk is not libellous or 
seditious”30, and it can just happen that they meet persons C,D,E and F who have the same 
rights to move  around and talk. So, in summary, Dicey seems to argue that the right to 
freedom of assembly is just a sum of freedom of movement and freedom of speech. Dicey did 
not grant the right to freedom of assembly a value of its own when he put down his ideas in 
the 19
th
 century. Although we must keep in mind the political and historical context Dicey was 
acting in, the author of this paper would argue that as a balancing illustration we can regard his 
thoughts.  
 
In the United States of America, however, the existentialistic question of separating the right 
to freedom of assembly is proposed and discussed also now.
31
 This does not mean an 
extensive and heated debate that would serve this paper with extensive material or answers, 
but rather another comparative view point.  
1.2.2 The Right to Freedom of Assembly in the USA 
The world‟s second oldest written constitution still in use is the Constitution of the USA32, 
adopted 17 September, 1787. Although with a central meaning for the legal and political 
system in the USA, the text of the Constitution itself does not entail individual rights and 
liberties, freedoms. The latter are found in the first 10 amendments to the Constitution that 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., p. 169. 
28
 Ibid., p. 170. 
29
 Ibid., p. 170.  
30
 Ibid., p. 170.  
31
 Inazu (2010). Inazu‟s book: “Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly” will 
be published by Yale University Press in 2012. 
32
 Johnson Paugh (2011).  
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altogether form the Bill of Rights that came into effect 15 December 1791
33
. The Bill of 
Rights is the fundamental source of protection of individual rights in the USA.  
 
The right to freedom of assembly is entailed in the First Amendment. It reads: "Congress  shall  
make  no  law […] abridging […] the  right  of the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  
petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of grievances.” Although proposed by some,34 the 
possible dualism of the assembly right and petition allegedly meant by the drafters, will not be 
analysed, but the right to assembly will be looked at as separate from petition. What interests 
us, is the line between the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech as it is 
common for the American scholarly writings to use confusing terms as for example “symbolic 
speech” and “expressive conduct”.  
A good point of departure is offered by C. Herman Pritchett whose writings deal with “a part 
of freedom of speech called speech plus conduct”.35 “Speech plus conduct” involves the 
communication of ideas by patrolling, marching, and picketing on sidewalks, streets, or other 
public areas.
36
 Pritchett names the “speech plus” a constitutional hybrid and explains: […] the 
picketing and demonstrating involve physical movement of the participants, who rely less 
upon the persuasive influence of speech to achieve their purposes and more upon the public 
impact of assembling, marching, and patrolling. Their purpose is to bring a point of view – by 
signs, slogans, singing, or their mere presence – to the attention of the widest possible public, 
including those uninterested or even hostile […].37  
 
                                                 
33
 The First Amendment: Freedom of Assembly and Petition. Its Constitutional History and the 
Contemporary Debate (2010) p. 19.  
34
 See further e.g: Mazzone (2002) and Freedom of Assembly and Petition. Its Constitutional 
History and the Contemporary Debate (2010).  
35
 Pritchett (1984) p. 39. 
36
 Ibid., 39-40. 
37
 Ibid., p. 40. 
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With that, Pritchett proposes similarly to Dicey
38
 that assembly is related to freedom of 
speech. However, there‟s an important difference between the arguments of Dicey and 
Pritchett. Notably, when Dicey defines assembly as a ”consequence” of freedom of speech and 
freedom of movement, then Pritchett gives an emphasis to the conduct (act). The latter, 
however, is apparently one of the defining and essential assembly-elements that precisely 
differs the right to freedom of assembly from the right to freedom of speech. This will be 
elaborated more in sub-section 1.3.4.  
 
It must be noted however, that symbolic speech does not equal right to freedom of assembly. 
Pritchett‟s proposal of recognizing the “conduct” as something valuable or worth mentioning 
is important because it emerges one of the assembly-elements, but it does not mean that there 
cannot be such phenomenon as “symbolic speech”. On the contrary – “symbolic speech” or 
“expressive conduct” is a sub-form of freedom of speech. According to Pritchett “[…] 
symbolic speech involves the communicating of ideas or protests by conduct, such as burning 
a card or pouring blood over draft files to express opposition to Vietnam War. Such action 
serves as surrogate for speech and conveys an ideational message perhaps more effectively 
than speech would do.”39 With that in mind, the author of this paper would argue that 
symbolic speech of one person should be under the protection of the freedom of speech, i.e. 
the free speech framework. But if symbolic speech “develops” into temporary group of people 
exercising symbolic speech, it can already be the case of the right to freedom of speech as will 
be later seen.  
 
Although the right of assembly has been the object of a USA Supreme Court decisions
40
 many 
times, the Court seems not to place too much value on the distinction between the rights under 
the First Amendment. It is as if it did not matter whether a person is protected through the 
concept of “freedom of expression”, “right to freedom of assembly”, or “symbolic speech”, as 
                                                 
38
 See sub-section 1.2.1.  
39
 Ibid., p. 50. 
40
 See for example: Hague v. CIO (1939), or States v. Cruikshank (1876).  
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long as the protection is effective. This kind of approach might be the result of the source of 
the protection – the First Amendment – as it incorporates the freedom of speech, right to 
freedom of assembly and the petition right to one sentence, or the distinct legal system of the 
USA. Whatever the reason, the author of this paper would still argue that the right to freedom 
of assembly firstly has a distinctive concept that needs to be distinguished from other human 
rights as will be shown in the following parts.  
 
1.3 What are the elements that define the Right to Freedom of Assembly?  
 
Contrary to UDHR, ECHR and ICCPR, Guidelines (2010) offer a definition of an assembly. 
Guidelines point 1.2 proposes: “ […] an assembly means the intentional and temporary 
presence of a number of individuals in a public place for a common expressive purpose.[…]”. 
This is a fairly ideal definition as it incorporates the intent of the people to gather, the non-
permanent character of the assembly, the requirement for a public place and the n+1 of 
participants, i.e. group criterion, and the common expressive purpose, i.e. act/conduct. The 
author of this paper would argue that if an universal definition of this kind would be 
incorporated into the human rights conventions, the scope of the right would be much more 
clear.  
We will now turn to look these elements more closely.  
1.3.1 Intent and Agenda/Content 
The definition of Guidelines (2010) provides that one aspect about assembly is that it requires 
persons‟ intentional presence. Guidelines (2010) do not elaborate on that requirement. 
However, the author of this paper would argue that the intent is an important criterion when 
defining an assembly and its participants. Firstly, because this intention to participate in the 
assembly is what differs participants from mere by-passers. And secondly, it will be argued 
that it is necessary that the participants to the alleged assembly themselves would regard their 
activities as an exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.  
 14 
 
The latter proposal could somewhat be rebutted by UN HRC case Kivenmaa v. Finland.
41
 
Kivenmaa v. Finland involved Auli Kivenmaa who gathered with other 25 members of her 
organization near the Presidential Palace, distributed leaflets, raised a banner. She was charged 
violating Finnish assembly act by holding a “public meeting” without a prior notification.42 
The main claim of Kivenmaa‟s complaint was that the gathering did not fall within the 
definition of “public meeting”.43 UN HRC delivered a decision in favour of Kivenmaa and 
argued that: “[…] it is evident […] that the gathering of several individuals at the site of the 
welcoming ceremonies for a foreign head of State on an official visit, publicly announced in 
advance by the State party authorities, cannot be regarded as a demonstration.” 44 
However, this decision was criticized in a dissent by Mr Herndl: “[…] If this does not 
constitute a demonstration, indeed a public gathering within the scope of article 21 of the 
Covenant, what else would constitute a „peaceful assembly‟ in that sense […].”45 Herndl 
continued: “[…] The decisive element for the determination of an “assembly” – as opposed to 
a more or less accidental gathering (e.g. people waiting for a bus, listening to a band, etc.) – 
obviously is the intention and the purpose of the individuals who come together 
[…]”.46According to Herndl‟s dissent, Kivenmaa and her group admittedly joined the event to 
make a political demonstration, and could not have been just bystanders. Therefore, the crux 
of Herndl‟s argument is that even if the participants do not have the intention to regard their 
activities as an assembly, their activities can form one nevertheless.  
But the author of this paper would argue that Herndl might have misunderstood the UN HRC. 
We could put emphasis on the “official visit, publicly announced in advance” and might argue 
that as the whole event of people coming to see the head of state of the other state was 
                                                 
41
 Auli Kivenmaa v. Finland (1994).  
42
 Ibid., para. 2.1.  
43
 Ibid., para. 3.  
44
 Ibid., para 9.2. 
45
 Ibid., in Individual Opinion, para. 2.5.  
46
 Ibid., in Individual Opinion, para. 2.7.  
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planned, Kivenmaa and her organisation members could not have hold an assembly within that 
planned event or “become” an assembly by “just raising the banner”.  
Another element that is closely linked to intent is “agenda”. This means according to  Martin 
Nowak that the participants to an assembly gather for a specific purpose.
47
 The author of this 
paper would argue that an assembly requires an opinion, a statement, a viewpoint that the 
participants want to share with the public. This means that the participants must have a 
common agenda that they want to make heard, seen. As Nowak further notes, Article 21 is 
directed at assemblies concerned with the discussion or proclamation of ideas.
48
 This does not 
mean only political agenda or anything specific, but the author of this paper would argue that 
the content itself is not important as long as there is an agenda as such. Hypothetically, we 
could ask what happens if there are different agendas within seemingly one assembly? The 
paper would put forward that then we should first identify the agendas and then see whether 
there are actually two or more assemblies taking place. Why is the agenda that participants 
want to share with the public so important for the definition of the assembly? Because with 
that distinction we can differentiate for example Herndl‟s “accidental” crowd gatherings or 
public events
49
 from the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly.  
1.3.2 Temporary group  
Just as Guidelines (2010) provide, the author of this paper would also argue that one of the 
elements of the assembly is a temporarily assembled group of persons. ECHR, ICCPR or 
UDHR do not provide when an assembly “starts”, i.e. how many persons are required for an 
assembly to be formed. The Guidelines (2010) state that: “An assembly, […] requires the 
presence of at least two persons. […], an individual protester exercising […] right to freedom 
of expression, where the protester‟s physical presence is an integral part of that expression, 
                                                 
47
 Nowak (1993) p. 373.  
48
 Nowak (1993) p. 374.   
49
 On the topic of differentiating between assembly and public event, see further the example 
of Love Parade in Germany. In: Cutting-in On the Dance: The Federal Constitutional Court 
Rejects a Motion for a Temporary Injunction from Berlin's Love Parade (2001).  
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should also be afforded the same protections as those who gather together as […] an 
assembly.”50  
 
It will be argued with this paper that the requirement for assembly is the n+1 rule which 
dictates that at least two persons are required for an assembly. However, the author of this 
paper does not necessarily agree with the Guidelines (2010) that claim the right to freedom of 
assembly protection to one person whose “physical presence is an integral part of his 
expression of views”. As explained before in this paper, symbolic speech or speech plus 
conduct is a possible concept protected by the freedom of speech provisions. The author of 
this paper would argue that it would be confusing to apply the right to freedom of assembly 
provisions on one-person-situations, and then still claim that assembly needs at least two 
persons.  
 
The view of the author that n+1 rule should apply is also supported by UN HRC case Patrick 
John Coleman v. Australia
51
 that was deemed inadmissible in regards to Article 21 as: “In the 
Committee's view, the author has not advanced sufficient elements to show that an „assembly‟, 
within the meaning of article 21 of the Covenant, in fact existed” as Coleman was acting alone 
52when “ […] standing on the edge of a water fountain in the mall with a large flag with a pole 
over his shoulder and then moving on to a concrete table close to the fountain, he loudly spoke 
for some 15 to 20 minutes on a range of subjects […].”53  
 
The author of this paper would additionally argue that this clarity in “quantity” should be 
provided by law, and not be a subject of discretion of the law enforcement bodies. A good 
example is the third available UN HRC case on the right to freedom of assembly.  In Elena 
Zalesskaya v. Belarus, Zalesskaya together with other two persons, distributed newspapers and 
                                                 
50
 Guidelines (2010), point 16, pp. 29-30.  
51
 Patrick John Coleman v. Australia (2006), para. 6.4.  
52
 Emphasis added by the author.  
53
 Patrick John Coleman v. Australia (2006), para. 2.1.  
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leaflets to passers-by on a sidewalk. Soon after, they were arrested by the police and 
Zalesskaya was accused of violation of the procedure for organizing and conducting street 
marches.
54
 Zalesskaya maintained that her movement on a sidewalk and distribution of 
newspapers and leaflets to passers-by cannot be considered a street march.
55
 Zalesskaya also 
claimed that : “[…] the Law „On Mass Events‟ in Belarus is ambiguous and lacks clarity, as it 
does not define precisely the term „mass event‟ and does not specify the lower limit of the 
number of participants in order for an event to be qualified as „mass‟ event”.56 Belarus 
acknowledged this fact, but submitted that “[…] the question of qualification of one or another 
event as a „mass‟ event shall be decided each time by the competent state organs.”57 The 
author of this paper would argue that this legal uncertainty has a negative effect on the right to 
freedom of assembly as rights-holders would not know when their activity should be pre-
notified. However, the UN HRC did not comment on that as they found that the issue before it 
is not the question how the author's actions ought to be qualified as their “[…] task is not to 
evaluate the facts and evidence made by the courts of the State party or interpret its domestic 
legislation.” Rather, they found “it is called upon to decide whether the imposition of the fine 
amounts to a violation of article 19 of the Covenant”.58  
 
Now one might ask why do two persons in front of the government building are protected by 
the right to freedom of assembly, but one person in front of the very same building would not. 
The author of this paper would argue that there is a different degree of protection needed as a 
group is seen a larger disturbance than one individual.  
 
Another important character of an assembly is that it is a temporary phenomenon. This 
demonstrates the borderline between the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of 
                                                 
54
 Elena Zalesskaya v. Belarus (2011), para. 2.1.  
55
 Ibid., para. 4.3.  
56
 Ibid., para. 10.3.  
57
 Ibid., para. 10.3.  
58
 Ibid., para. 10.4.  
 18 
 
association – the latter is of permanent character.59 This does not necessarily mean time as 
such as also assemblies can take place for a longer time of period, but rather it demonstrates 
again the intent of the participants: an association would at least in principle have a focus on 
future as well whereas for assembly the present is more important.  
1.3.3 Public Forum 
The Guidelines (2010) provide: “The Guidelines apply to assemblies held in public places that 
everyone has an equal right to use (including, but not limited to, public parks, squares, streets, 
roads, avenues, sidewalks, pavements and footpaths).”60 This part of the Guidelines (2010) 
describes another essential character of an assembly – it has to take place in a public place. 
This follows the ideology of the essence of right to freedom of assembly as the participants of 
an assembly aspire for a dialogue with the public. In turn, a forum is created with the usage of 
a public place.  
The free and unrestricted use of a public place plays an important role for the right to freedom 
of assembly. For example, in the USA, the police and officials have a practice of using metal 
barricades and fences to create “free speech zones”61 for protesters. There is a traceable 
practice of the usage of those zones, but probably the most famous example is the Democratic 
National Convention. The USA Secret Service and the Boston Police Department set up a 
demonstration zone that consisted of fences standing eight feet high which were allegedly 
intended for protecting the participants, but resulted in “obstructing the view of delegates 
passing by on their way to the convention and, thus, effectively reduced the impact of the 
protest”.62 This example demonstrates how the free use of public forum can have a great effect 
on the efficient use of the right to freedom of assembly.  
However, there is a very important aspect about public forum. The author of this paper would 
argue that different from what is stated in Guidelines (2010), the notion of public forum is not 
                                                 
59
 See e.g. ICCPR Article 21, 2nd part of ECHR Article 11. 
60
 Guidelines (2010), point 19, p. 31.  
61
  Winnett (2004) p. 467.  
62
 Ibid., p. 468.  
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restricted to public place. Meaning that public forum does not necessarily form only in public 
places. In practice this means that public forum can form also in a private place, e.g. in a 
shopping mall, privately owned stadium etc. Based on D. Mead‟s analysis63 there are on the 
large scale three approaches concerning the place of an assembly. As one extreme, we could 
argue that people can assemble only on the land they own themselves. This would not be 
consistent with the idea of human rights (i.e. right to freedom of assembly) as person‟s right to 
assemble could not be dependant on whether he owns land or not. The other extreme 
according to Mead is when “the legal framework could permit a group to use whatever land 
they wanted – no matter who owned it […]. This, clearly, would have the effect of overturning 
centuries of private law jurisprudence”.64 And the third approach would come as a 
combination of the other two: whether meaning that the consent must be obtained from a land-
owner, or some other in-between solution.  
For this paper the public forum would mean two things: first all public places and secondly, 
private places where the public forum has been “activated” – meaning that there is a dialogue 
between the person and the public – and where there is a consent of the owner of the private 
place. However, it is important to note that if, for example, an assembly is held on private land 
and the owner has not issued the consent, then the participants should leave not because the 
assembly regulation does not allow holding an assembly there, but because the restriction 
comes from private law.  
1.3.4 Act/Conduct  
The last essential element of an assembly is the act/conduct. Act can mean chanting, singing, 
holding banners, posters etc., but the author of this paper would argue that act does not equal 
activity. But an act as an element of assembly can also mean non-activity. This means that e.g. 
the participants of the assembly just come together and sit. Thus, this paper would claim that 
the act here has two (if not more) levels. First and even primary level is the act of persons 
coming together (the moment we can determine the beginning of an assembly) and the second 
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 Mead talks about protests, but his analysis can also be applied on assemblies in general.  
64
 Mead (2010), p. 119.  
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level is the activity/non-activity that will take place. The first level can be also analysed from a 
more philosophical approach: there is a collective, democratic value in the right to freedom of 
assembly and in people assembling.
65
 
 
1.4 Conclusion of Chapter 1: Model  
The aim of Chapter 1 was to define the right to freedom of assembly.  With the Graph No. 1 
an illustrative summary for Chapter 1 is proposed. It demonstrates the interplay between the 
three rights: the right to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of association, 
and the elements of the right to freedom of assembly. The graph draws a distinction between 
assembly-elements that are characteristic only for the right to freedom of assembly, and 
assembly-elements that overlap with other rights. 
 
The keyword “intent” placed to subsume all three rights demonstrates the argument of the 
right to freedom of assembly among others requiring a person using the right to freedom of 
assembly to do that intentionally as explained before.  “Group” is what the right to freedom of 
assembly and freedom of association share, but the difference is created by the nature of the 
group – for association it is of permanent character, for assembly temporary.  “Act” (also 
conduct) is what differentiates the right to freedom of assembly from the freedom of speech, 
but it must be kept in mind that the difference is only there when the “Act” is combined with 
the “Group”, i.e. it is a right of a collective nature and value. Because if there is only one 
person involved in an occurrence of the “Act”, it is not an assembly, but a symbolic speech. 
And lastly, what the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech share is the usage of 
public forum and the Content/Agenda.  
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Graph No. 1: Assembly-elements and relations between the freedom of assembly, 
freedom of speech and freedom of association 
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2 The Problems and Developments of the Right to Freedom of Assembly in 
the light of the International Standard  
 
Chapter 2 will ask and answer for the existence and concept of international standard-setting: 
what is an international standard and how is it made up? Why is it necessary? It will also be 
established what is the international standard for the right to freedom of assembly. 
The second part of Chapter 2 will introduce and analyse the developments of the right to 
freedom of assembly that are potentially problematic for the sources of law regulating the 
right. Consecutively, under every potentially problematic development it will be proposed 
how the standard should address that.  
2.1 What is an international standard and why do we need it? 
2.1.1 Why do we need international standards in human rights law? 
 
The point of departure for this question can be found in the analysis by Henry J. Steiner. He 
asks: “Are not matters like implementation and protection better left in the hands of 
governments and civil society in the different States, particularly since human rights issues are 
imbedded in national […] governments, traditions, and cultures?” Steiner then proposes that: 
“[…] standard-setting by itself – the declarations and treaties that dominated the early decades 
of the human rights movement, and the related spread to interest groups, media and the 
general population of this new discourse of international human rights – will advance the 
cause of human rights.” Steiner explains further that when states internalise treaty norms, 
those norms become the “key ingredient of the domestic legal system” and can in the longer 
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run influence how people think about issues.
66
 Steiner further discusses that international 
treaties give human rights advocates and others the means to base their demands against their 
states and thus, the text of a treaty can be regarded as a tool of empowerment.
67
 However, the 
author of this paper would like to draw attention to the fact that this is the case of treaties, i.e. 
when states have taken treaty obligations. It is harder to base demands on soft law.  
The need for international standards is also summarised by the UN who states that the 
international human rights standards were developed to protect people's human rights against 
violations by individuals, groups or nations.
68
 According to Makau Mutua, the important thing 
is that there is a nexus between the state and the abuse committed. This nexus is necessary 
because the state is the basic obligor of the human rights corpus. It is the target of human 
rights standards.
69
 There would be no purpose to developing standards, but never enforcing or 
implementing them. 
70
 
In sum, with referring to words of Christine Chikin we can argue that human rights law (and 
standards) “[…] speaks to people who appeal to its standards against what they regard as 
unwarranted state intrusion into their lives. It provides a language, a methodology, and 
techniques for challenging state action”. 71 
2.1.2 The definition of an international standard  
The law dictionaries do not offer a definition of the international standard.
72
 What is 
commonly known, is the term “international minimum standard”, but this has no relevancy for 
the object of this paper.
73
 Mutua states that: “A standard is a vacuous, empty receptacle into 
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which one can fit almost anything. It refers to a level of achievement or expectation that may 
carry with it moral, cultural, or other civilizational aspiration.”74 Mutua‟s proposal that a 
standard refers to “level of achievement or expectation” appears to be appropriate in 
international law and human rights law. Because what is mainly found in the relevant 
literature, are “international human rights standards”75 and the latter are usually linked to the 
activities of UN: “To enhance respect for fundamental human rights and to further progress 
towards their realization, the UN adopted a three-pronged approach: (a) establishment of 
international standards […]”76 
But if we want to move away from that general level and get some specific insight into 
international standard in regards to the right to freedom of assembly, we must ask what do the 
“level of achievement or expectation” and “international standards” compose of?  
Mutua proposes that a standard encompasses both norms and rights: “That is why the process 
and exercise of the creation of expectations and obligations in human rights can be referred to 
as standard setting, an expression that covers both binding and non-binding rules and codes of 
conduct.”77 Thus, a standard can find its base from hard law and soft law instruments.  
The most widely used instruments for the creation of human rights standards are treaties and 
declarations.
78
 There appears to be consensus within the UN and among states, academics, and 
human rights advocates that UDHR is the most significant embodiment of human rights 
standards.
79
 The preamble of UDHR itself also sets out that the text of UDHR is a “common 
standard” for international human rights law. 
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2.1.3 What is the international standard for the right to freedom of assembly made 
of? 
Following that model of what an international standard should comprise of, the international 
standard of the right to freedom of assembly should base on the sources noted already in 
Chapter 1: UDHR (Article 20) and the subsequent ICCPR (Article 21). As the region of object 
of this paper is Europe, ECHR (Article 11, 2
nd
 part) can also be regarded as a source for that 
standard. However, as noted in Chapter 1, the relevant provisions of these treaties and the 
declaration prove to be quite laconic. One could of course argue that a “standard” needs to be 
with a certain level of generality and thus, regard the laconic manner very appropriate. 
However, the author of this paper would argue that there are different degrees and 
understandings of generality, and “generality” does not necessarily mean short and of little 
guidance. This means that a provision in a treaty could provide more information and help, but 
not lose its value as a general standard that can be applied universally. In turn, this paper 
would propose that if those provisions would entail for example the proposed elements of the 
right to freedom of assembly, and thus the scope of protection, the standard would be much 
more concrete. What is more, without any intention to undermine the value of assembly-
provisions in UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR, the author of this paper would also argue that the 
field of the right to freedom of assembly has grown and changed to a large extent since the 
treaties and the declaration were composed, and the standard that they offer is thus outdated. A 
legal source that would offer more detailed and specific standards is missing.  
A good analogy to this proposal is found from other fields of human rights law where we meet 
area or right-specific conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women as an extension of ICCPR Article 26 and UDHR Article 7, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child corresponding to the Article 24 of the ICCPR and 
Article 25 of UDHR, and Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data specifying Article 17 ICCPR and Article 12 UDHR.  
What is more, as noted before, this paper will also refer to ECourtHR and UN HRC case-law. 
What is the meaning of case-law for the international standard? The author of this paper would 
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argue that this depends on how the dispute settlement body itself relates to case-law: whether 
it considers it binding for its future decisions, uses it for interpretation, or whether one court 
relies on the case-law of another court etc. Thus, ECourtHR and UN HRC case-law can be 
considered part of international standard to the extent it is part of the ECHR and ICCPR. 
The second part of what can offer standards, is soft law. Ulrika Morth identifies two main 
components of soft law: it is not legally binding, and it comes in many different forms.
80
 The 
forms of soft law can be divided into three groups.
81
 The first group are non-binding decisions 
of international organizations and bodies (e.g. guidelines, programmes, opinions, plans of 
action), non-obligatory agreements and declarations created by states belong to the second 
group
82
 and the third category are recommendations passed by non-governmental 
organizations which can have a considerable impact in terms of international practice.
83
 
For the right of freedom of assembly there are the already referred Guidelines (2010). As the 
treaties and declaration are lacking more detailed guidance, Guidelines (2010) seem to be very 
useful and necessary. However, the author of this paper would argue that it is not very clear 
whether they should be regarded or if they even aim for to be regarded as part of the 
international standard for the right to freedom of assembly. The author of this paper would 
claim that ICCPR, UDHR and ECHR would need a thorough and up-to-date soft law source as 
a supporting source of international law, and as the Guidelines (2010) offer more detailed 
information, they could be that support.  
However, if we look at how the drafters have perceived the (aim of the) Guidelines (2010), it 
appears that they do not necessarily see them as a standard-setting instrument. Guidelines 
(2010):”They [Guidelines] set out a clear minimum baseline in relation to these standards, 
thereby establishing a threshold that must be met by national authorities in their regulation of 
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freedom of peaceful assembly. This document, however, does not attempt to codify these 
standards or summarize the relevant case law.”84 Furthermore, “[…] this document does not 
attempt to provide ready-made solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to draft a single, 
transferable “model law” that can be adopted by all OSCE participating States. Rather, the 
Guidelines and the Explanatory Notes seek to clarify key issues and discuss possible ways to 
address them. […]”.85  
Guidelines (2010) and Explanatory Notes are, therefore, primarily addressed to “practitioners 
– drafters of legislation, politicians, legal professionals, police officers and other law-
enforcement personnel, local officials, trade unionists, the organizers of and participants in 
assemblies, NGOs, civil society organizations and those involved in monitoring both freedom 
of assembly and police practices.”86 
In sum, it remains rather unclear and vague what is the official status of the Guidelines (2010) 
in the light of the international standard of the right to freedom of assembly.  
To offer some comparison of how the aim of Guidelines (2010) could also be worded and thus 
better perceived, an example will be brought. Although the purpose and scope of these 
guidelines are different from the Guidelines (2010), the connection to the international 
standard is still emphasized and taken into consideration. In 2002 a pan- Commonwealth
87
 
Expert Group was convened to develop "Guidelines of Best Practice to Promote Freedom of 
Expression, Assembly and Association".
88
 Commonwealth Guidelines set out that they “offer 
assistance to member states of the Commonwealth to give effect to their international 
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obligations relevant to freedom of expression, assembly and association”.89 As the 
introduction of the Commonwealth Guidelines notes, they seek "to explore practical ways of 
converting and applying [the minimum international] standards at the domestic level so that a 
synergy can develop between international human rights obligations of members and the 
reality of national or domestic practice".
90
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the Commonwealth Guidelines aim for being part of the 
international standard by addressing the international standard created by UDHR and ICCPR 
for the domestic level. The author of this paper would suggest that it would benefit the scarce 
amount of sources of the international standard of the right to freedom of assembly if 
Guidelines (2010) were to more strongly considered as a source of the standard. Nevertheless, 
as Guidelines (2010) do talk about addressing the international standard to some extent and 
there are not – as mentioned several times already – too many other detailed sources available, 
then in this paper the international standard for the right to freedom of assembly will be based 
on UDHR, ICCPR,  ECHR and Guidelines (2010).
91
 
2.2 The new developments and problems of the right to freedom of assembly 
 
Chapter 1 concluded with a graph illustrating the right to freedom of assembly and its 
elements. It is an abstract model, a proposed common understanding of what the right is, and 
what are the core elements of the right to freedom of assembly. The model was proposed as an 
independent idea without adding any specific context. But in practice there is always a context 
where a model operates. In our case the context is the international standard of the right to 
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freedom of assembly. Thus, in the following part of Chapter 2 it will be investigated how the 
elements of the right to freedom of assembly emerge in the context of the international 
standard and a selection of problems that may occur with the exercise of the right and the 
application of assembly regulations will be presented. The paper avoids just repeating and 
rewording what has been discussed in Guidelines (2010). As Guidelines (2010) are recent and 
voluminous, they manage to address possibly all the important aspects of the right to freedom 
of assembly. Thus, a selection of less discussed issues will be presented.  
 
2.2.1 Group – the subjects of the right  
 
One of the core elements of the right to freedom of assembly is the group. The question of 
how many people form a group and thus may form an assembly, was tackled in Chapter 1. But 
there is another aspect for discussion if we move away from the concept of the assembly and 
look at the group forming the assembly in the light of the international standard of the right. 
Does the international standard propose the right to freedom of assembly as a human right, as 
everyone‟s right? The texts of UDHR Article 20 and ECHR Article 11 explicitly use the word 
“everyone”. Article 21 ICCPR remains less direct and provides that the right “shall be 
recognized”. This does not indicate whether it would be recognized for everyone or not. 
However, an investigation into the preparatory works of ICCPR demonstrates that an 
everyone‟s right was what the drafters had in mind. The Drafting Committee materials 
demonstrate that in the first session in 1947 the wording of the provision was “There shall be 
freedom of peaceful assembly” which is similar to the final text.92 However, during the 
subsequent sessions the wording changed several times and described the right to freedom of 
assembly as “all persons”, “everyone‟s” right and as one version proposed “No one shall be 
denied freedom to assemble peaceably without […]”93 One opinion was that the right should 
be enunciated as in Article 20 of UDHR: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
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peaceful assembly" as such a formulation, it was thought, would make it clear that the right 
belongs to every person.
94
 Therefore we can conclude that the passive wording of Article 21 
ICCPR also refers that the right to freedom of assembly is everyone‟s right. 
 
Guidelines (2010) also address the subjects of the right to freedom of assembly and provide: 
“Freedom of peaceful assembly is to be enjoyed equally by everyone.”95 The Guidelines 
(2010) demonstrate their usefulness and importance by adding extra explanation to what 
“everyone” in legal context really means: it is further explained also that the freedom to 
organize and participate in assemblies must be guaranteed equally to nationals and non-
nationals (including stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers, migrants 
and tourists), to children and to persons without full legal capacity, including persons with 
mental illnesses.
96
 Also, according to the international human rights law “aliens receive the 
benefit of the right of peaceful assembly”.97  
 
The same idea has been expressed by ECourtHR in the Cisse v. France case, where the 
applicant was an illegal immigrant who together with a group of aliens took collective action 
to draw attention to the difficulties they were experiencing in obtaining a review of their 
immigration status in France. The applicant occupied a church with others, but this was 
stopped by the police. Although overall the ECourtHR did not find a violation of Article 11, it 
held that the fact that the applicant was an illegal immigrant did not suffice to justify a breach 
of her freedom of assembly.
98
 
 
Thus, in summary, we can conclude that according to the international standard the right to 
freedom of assembly should be guaranteed for everyone without discrimination. Whether this 
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international standard is followed by the domestic regulations of the example countries, will 
be seen in Chapter 3.  
 
2.2.2 Spontaneous assemblies  
 
One integral element of the right to freedom of assembly is that the persons exercising the 
right use a public forum that can form in a public place. This is also the connecting reason 
why there are restrictions to the right that are allowed under some circumstances. The 
international standard also provides the possibility for restrictions – mainly in the form of 
“limiting clauses”.99 
 
There are many sub-issues and problems raised by the implementation of those restrictions, 
but we will discuss only one of them – the possibility of a spontaneous assembly, i.e. an 
assembly without any prior act of notification. The reason we choose this issue is the 
considerable growth of the tendency of people using mobile phones, text messaging, social 
networking to organize an assembly. This in turn means that a decision to assemble may be 
very spontaneous and thus, a prior notification is not an option. These situations may 
especially occur when there is something happening that needs an immediate reaction and 
postponing the assembly due to notification requirement may violate the right to freedom of 
assembly.  
 
UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR do not offer a specific international standard for that problem. The 
limiting clauses in them give room to interpretations of both directions. Guidelines (2010), 
however touch upon the issue of spontaneous assemblies. They provide: “Spontaneous 
assemblies should be lawful […] Laws regulating freedom of assembly should explicitly 
provide either for exemption from prior-notification requirements for spontaneous assemblies 
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(where giving advance notice is impracticable) or for a shortened notification period (whereby 
the organizer must notify the authorities as soon as is practicable) […]”.100  
 
In addition, the ECourtHR has also confirmed in the case of Bukta and the Others v. Hungary 
that: “[…] in special circumstances when an immediate response […] to a political event 
might be justified, a decision to disband the ensuing, peaceful assembly solely because of the 
absence of the requisite prior notice, without any illegal conduct by the participants, amounts 
to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly.”101 Quite the same has 
ECourtHR expressed in the case of Eva Molnar v. Hungary: “[…] the right to hold 
spontaneous demonstrations may override the obligation to give prior notification to public 
assemblies only in special circumstances, namely if an immediate response to a current event 
is warranted in the form of a demonstration. […]”.102 It is interesting to note however, that in 
that case the ECourtHR did not find a violation of Article 11 ECHR as it concluded that the 
facts of that case did not disclose such special circumstances to which the only adequate 
response was an immediate demonstration and that the applicant had a sufficiently long time 
to show solidarity with her co-demonstrators.
103
  
 
Although not explicitly stated, it can be concluded based on the case law of the ECourtHR and 
the Guidelines (2010) that according to the international standard of the right to freedom of 
assembly, the occurrence of spontaneous assembly should be allowed. The author of this paper 
would advise that a more efficient and better application of the international standard would be 
guaranteed if the domestic assembly regulations had provisions regulating the issue of 
spontaneous assemblies. Whether this is the practice of the states will be investigated again in 
Chapter 3 of this paper.  
 
                                                 
100 Guidelines (2010) point 128, p. 68.  
101 Bukta and the Others v. Hungary (2007), para. 38.  
102 Eva Molnar and the Others v. Hungary (2008), para. 38.  
103
 Ibid., see para.-s 39, 43.  
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2.2.3 Peacefulness of the act  
One of the assembly elements is also the act/conduct. According to the international standard 
the act, i.e. the assembly has to be peaceful: UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR all protect only a 
peaceful assembly. Further, the Guidelines (2010) also provide that only peaceful assemblies 
are protected and: “An assembly should be deemed peaceful if its organizers have professed 
peaceful intentions and the conduct of the assembly is non-violent. […] „peaceful‟ should be 
interpreted to include conduct that may annoy or give offence, and even conduct that 
temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties.”104 
 
But for example, it has been argued that the adjective “peaceful” has restricted the scope of the 
protection offered by ECHR Article 11, para. 1 to a very large extent.
105
 Because if the 
planned or occurring assembly is not peaceful, the authorities may prohibit it without referring 
to Article 11 para. 2 that requires that the prohibition or restriction be “prescribed by law”.106 
However, a peacefully organised demonstration that runs the risk of resulting in disorder by 
developments beyond the control of the organisers, e.g. through a violent counter-
demonstration, does not for that reason fall outside the scope of Article 11 of the 
Convention.
107
 
 
Thus, on the one hand there is a restriction to the right to freedom of assembly provided by the 
international standard itself – the requirement of peacefulness. But on the other hand the 
author of this paper would argue that this restriction of the right is justified as it aims at what 
is meant by the human right to freedom of assembly and a violent act that also carries the 
elements of an assembly. Thus, for this paper and especially for Chapter 3 the requirement of 
peacefulness will be defined as what was formulated by the ECourtHR: “[…] that the freedom 
to take part in a peaceful assembly […] is of such importance that it cannot be restricted in any 
                                                 
104
 Guidelines (2010), para. 1.3, p. 15.  
105
 Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (2006) p. 821.  
106
 Ibid., p. 821.  
107
 See e.g.: Plattform Ärzte für das Leben vs. Austria (1988), para. 32.  
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way […] so long as the person concerned does not himself commit any reprehensible act on 
such an occasion.”108 
2.2.4 New forms of assemblies?  
 
The last issue under this chapter will bring all the assembly-elements together to one analysis 
and will establish whether the possible new forms of assemblies actually are assemblies, or 
rather just appear to be. Chapter 1 found its conclusion with a graph showing the elements of 
the right to freedom of assembly. This graph does not carry only theoretical importance, but is 
defining also in practice because as noted before – if we cannot determine whether something 
is an assembly, we cannot proceed to protect that “something” with right to freedom of 
assembly regulation. Therefore, that “something” has to have the elements of assembly. 
Maybe somewhat surprisingly it is not always as black and white as it could be. The following 
part will investigate the possibility of “flash mob” and “planking” falling under the assembly 
definition.  
 
Flash mob and planking  
 
Guidelines (2010) categorize a flash mob as a form of an assembly without much detailed 
analysis.
109
 However, it might not be that straightforward. What is a flash mob? There are 
different definitions offered for flash mob. It would serve this paper to look at two of them. 
The online Merriam-Webster Dictionary offers the following: “Flash mob is defined as a 
group of people summoned (as by e-mail or text message) to a designated location at a 
specified time to perform an indicated action before dispersing. And the Oxford Dictionaries 
Online provides: “A public gathering of complete strangers, organized via the Internet or 
mobile phone who perform a pointless act and then disperse again.” 
                                                 
108
 Ezelin v. France (1991), para.53.  
109 Guidelines (2010), point 17, p. 30.  
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These definitions offer a good point of departure for the analysis. Firstly, it can be noted that 
the second definition provided by the Oxford Dictionaries is less neutral and gives an 
evaluation to the action (act) by calling it “pointless”. Further, for some reason it places 
emphasis also on the fact that the people gathering have to be “complete strangers”. What 
those two definitions share however, are the following elements: group, emphasis on action, 
limited time (temporary action). The Oxford Dictionaries‟ definition also indicates that a flash 
mob is a public gathering.  
 
The assembly elements introduced in Chapter 1 were: group, temporary act, public forum, 
content and intent. If we compare these elements to the elements of a flash mob, we could 
argue that by and large a flash mob is an assembly. However, can we really say that a pillow 
fight that only aims for fun, entertainment and surprise-effect is an exercise of the right to 
freedom of assembly? The author of this paper would argue that the “content” or agenda-
element of the act is what may draw the line. When we take the examples of common flash 
mobs such as a pillow fight or a slow-motion dance, we see that the act – the fight or the dance 
– is just a pure act without a meaning, without the intent to express a view, opinion, without a 
content.  
So, generally flash mobs are seen just as performing art form, but there have been some cases 
where flash mobs become political, acquire an agenda. For example, in Belarus during the 
elections in 2006 the flash mobs began to be political: a mass of people gathered in the centre 
of Minsk, simultaneously opened the newspaper “Soviet Belarus” (the “official” newspaper of 
the regime) and began tearing it into pieces. Furthermore, during another post-election flash 
mob, participants floated paper ships bearing the names of opponents of the Lukashenko 
regime who had been arrested.
110
 Similar tendencies of how flash mobs may fall under 
assembly right legislation have occurred also elsewhere.
111
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 Ousmanova (2010).   
111
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For an illustration it is interesting to shortly analyse also another social phenomenon called 
planking that is defined as “a prank that involves lying face down in a public place, with 
photos posted on social networking sites”112It enjoys some of the same characteristic elements 
as the flash mob: a temporary act in a public place. It does not require a group of people by the 
definition, but it can be performed by several people. Further, the conducted act – the prank – 
is even more simplistic than the act done during a flash mob. Thus, it would be difficult to 
regard a group of people planking an assembly. The content of the act is similarly to flash mob 
missing. However, there are already people who do planking with a purpose to express their 
views, whose act has the content. For example, in Taiwan two girls use it to promote causes, 
such as planking with stray dogs to draw attention to the plight of the animals, or planking in 
famous tourist spots to promote travelling.
113
 Thus, again we may start qualifying planking as 
a new form of assembly that grew out from a “prank”. 
 
“Cyber Assembly” 
 
As a third example we will briefly look at “cyber assembly”. There are actually two issues 
under that topic. One has been touched upon earlier in this paper and it is the tendency of 
people using text messaging, tweeting, social networks on the Internet to organize an 
assembly. It might fuel problems for assembly regulations in the context of spontaneous 
assemblies, but also, when the authorities start restricting the usage of those instruments in 
order to prevent people gathering, i.e exercising the right to freedom of assembly. This is what 
happened in the USA where the officials shut down cell-phone service in several of its 
underground stations because they said “they had information of planned protests and feared 
cell phones would be used to organize so-called „flash mob‟ demonstrations on its subway 
platforms, endangering protesters and others.”114 
 
                                                 
112
 Who, What, Why: What is planking?  (2011).  
113
 Made in Taiwan, the twins who have taken planking to another level. (2011).  
114
 BART cell shutdown a landmark in cyber-assembly issue. (2011). 
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Another issue here is the actual possibility of having a “cyber assembly” meaning that people 
“gather” on the Internet for example in a discussion forum.115 Or a “cyber picket” is created, 
as was the case of IBM workers in Italy in 2007 where the action featured sign-carrying 
avatars created by IBM workers.
116
 Or one tactic is setting up spoof web pages based on a 
company‟s logo or to use the protesting group‟s own page to display spoof items or 
products.
117
 
 
We might find here the elements of an assembly: those people form a temporary group, they 
use a public forum – the Internet, we might also detect this group‟s intent to gather on the 
Internet, but the author of this paper would argue that it is more difficult to argue for the 
existence of an act. If there is for example a declaration this group is signing, this is still more 
of the issue of freedom of speech. Another question is also whether we can qualify the 
Internet, the cyberspace as a public forum indeed. As Internet-usage has been influential also 
for the right to freedom of speech, the question of Internet being a public forum has been 
analysed by quite a few scholars.
118
 Some scholars have claimed that the Internet should be 
conceptualised as one grand “public forum”.119 At the same time we need to bear in mind that 
this might be only an illusion as “the vast majority of speech on the Internet today occurs 
within private places and spaces that are owned and regulated by private entities such as […] 
Yahoo! […]”. 120 However, if we take the understanding that a public forum can be created 
despite the classification of the place (see 1.3.3) –   whether it is public or private – we could 
argue that cyberspace can be a public forum.  
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Above all, as cyber-assemblies raise many additional and complex issues concerning Internet 
regulation, copyright, intellectual property, privacy etc. we can conclude that the “classic” 
assembly regulation falls short in addressing the issue of possible cyber-assembly.  
 
When we again turn to the international standard of the right to freedom of assembly, we find 
as mentioned before that UDHR, ICCPR and ECHR give almost no guidance to how to 
actually determine an assembly. Guidelines (2010) prove to be more helpful as they provide 
examples of assemblies, but state that “those examples are not exhaustive”, and furthermore, 
that “the domestic legislation should frame the types of assembly to be protected as broadly as 
possible”.121 Thus, the international standard would require from the domestic regulations to 
be broad enough to also cover possible new forms of assembly. How the domestic regulations 
of the selected example countries address the international standard or the proposed 
international standard will be seen Chapter 3.  
 
2.3 Conclusion of Chapter 2  
Chapter 2 investigated the international standard in general and established that the sources for 
the international standard of the right to freedom of assembly are UDHR, ICCPR and 
additionally – as the focus is on Europe – the regional ECHR and Guidelines (2010). It was 
further developed that according to the sources of these international standard instruments the 
right to freedom of assembly should be everyone‟s right, the regulation for assemblies should 
allow spontaneous assemblies, only peaceful assemblies are protected and the international 
standard alongside with domestic regulations should be ready for addressing the new forms of 
assemblies. If that standard is met by the domestic regulations, will be seen in the following 
chapter.   
                                                 
121
 Guidelines (2010), point 17, p. 30. 
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3 How are the Domestic Regulations of the selected Countries in Europe able 
to address the Developments and Potential Problems of the Right to 
Freedom of Assembly in the light of the International Standard of the Right? 
 
With the third and final chapter of this paper the principal research question of this thesis will 
be finding its answer. Chapter 1 laid a core, a foundation for the following analysis by 
introducing and analysing the right to freedom of assembly through its elements and 
summarising the elements in a graph. The same concept of elements was then used under 
Chapter 2 where through those elements the problems and developments that the domestic 
assembly-regulations need to address, were discussed. Chapter 2 also added a context where 
the elements and analysis was put – the international standard for the right to freedom of 
assembly. Now, with Chapter 3 it will be seen whether the international standard that is set for 
the problematic aspects of the right is met by the domestic regulations of the five selected 
countries.  
3.1 Methodology  
 
In the following two (3.1.1 – 3.1.2) sub-paragraphs the methodology used for Chapter 3 will 
be introduced and explained.  
 
3.1.1 Which countries and why have been selected for the analysis?  
 
The restricted scope of this paper would not allow analysing wholly the domestic regulations 
of one geographical region. Nevertheless, the author of this paper would argue that if a 
representative group of countries from a region is chosen, the emerging patterns still show a 
tendency that can be used for conclusions. The countries are chosen on the basis of their level 
 40 
 
of development, democracy index (DI)
122
, history and record in human rights with the intent to 
have different countries that share one regional standard-setting document – the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the choice is still dependant on the subjective preferences 
of the author of this paper.
123
 
 
The countries chosen are Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Russia and Sweden.
124
 Estonia (DI: 33; 
8,82)
125
 is chosen to represent a former Soviet Union country that has developed into strong 
democracy over the past 20 years. Georgia (DI: 103; 6,18) is a former Soviet Union country as 
well, but what differentiates it from Estonia are the struggles for democracy and often 
worrying human rights track record. Germany (DI: 14; 9,12) is chosen to represent countries 
that have a long history in human rights protection and are so-called old democracies. Sweden 
(DI: 4; 10,00) has been chosen to represent Scandinavian region with also an exemplary 
democracy. Russia (DI: 107; 4,71) representing the largest country in the region and a country 
with the second highest number of judgments from ECHR in 2010.
126
  
3.1.2 How is the analysis done and structured?  
 
It is not the aim of this paper to address the right to freedom of assembly in those countries 
exhaustively by elaborating on the social, historic and legal context in a detailed manner and 
covering all the possible issues, problems and case-law. Rather, the current chapter will be 
                                                 
122
 Democracy index 2010. 
123 The choice is also limited to the amount of material that was available. For example for 
several countries it was impossible to find translations of the relevant regulations from the 
original languages to a language known to the author.  
124
 Interestingly, the SR on the rights of freedom of  peaceful assembly and association has 
planned 39 country visits and among the chosen countries are also Georgia and Russia that are 
chosen for this paper. See further: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/AssemblyAssociation/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx [Visited 15 
November 2011].  
125 DI in the brackets indicates the rank of the country in a Democracy Index 2010 out of 167, 
and the following number a category score for “Civil Liberties” out of  maximum of 10,00.  
126 First one being Turkey. European Court of Human Rights. Statistical information: Annual 
Statistics. 
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based on the context established in Chapter 2 and thus, have the following narrow focus of 
interest in the form of five concrete questions. In simple terms it means that the domestic 
regulation of a country will be “put up” and compared against the international standard.127 
The information about the domestic legal sources is obtained from the online database 
http://legislationline.org/ which is managed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
128
 or searched from direct 
sources such as the official web-pages of the countries.  
 
The five questions proposed 
(1) What are the domestic legal sources for the right to freedom of assembly? 
There is a limitation to that question. The author of this paper has been concentrating on 
assembly-regulation provided by the constitutions and the specific assembly acts of the 
selected countries due to the restricted scope of this paper. Thus, this paper has relied on the 
LegislatiOnline database and if not indicated differently by the database (as for Sweden), the 
possibility of theses countries having other relevant regulations for the assembly has been 
disregarded. However, the author of this paper of course acknowledges that there might be 
additional regulations (e.g. police acts, anti-terrorist laws, emergency laws etc) that can affect 
the right to freedom of assembly in the selected countries.
129
 
(2) Who are the subjects of the right?  
(3) Does the domestic regulation allow spontaneous assemblies?  
                                                 
127 While writing this paper, the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR published the 
Joint Opinion on the Draft Law on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly of Ukraine. The Joint 
Opinion is structured and built up using a method similar to this paper: the suggestions for 
changes of the Draft Law are based on Guidelines (2010) and the international standard.  
128 Description of the database: “Legislationline, a free-of-charge online legislative database, 
was created in 2002 to assist OSCE participating States in bringing their legislation into line 
with relevant international human-rights standards.” See further:  
http://www.osce.org/node/43644 [Visited 26 October 2011].  
129
 These “side-issues”  have in turn their own international standards. See e.g. International 
Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement.  
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(4) Does the domestic regulation consider “peacefulness” as inseparable element of the 
right to freedom of assembly? 
Peacefulness will be understood here as of explained in Chapter 2: the participants of the 
assembly should not be violent. And thus the domestic regulations will be analysed for 
having the same concept and understanding of peacefulness.  
 
(5) Would the assembly definition(s) provided by the domestic regulation subsume the 
“new forms” of assemblies?  
This question will look at the assembly definitions and analyse whether possible new forms 
such as planking and flash mob could fit under the definition. The international standard as 
explained in Chapter 2 would require the definition of an assembly to be not a narrow one. As 
the third new form – “cyber assembly” – would demand a more thorough analysis of laws 
regulating Internet and copyright, it will be left out from the scope of the question here.  
 
3.2 How do the specific domestic regulations of the selected countries address the 
international standard? 
3.2.1 Estonia  
 
(1) For Estonia there are two relevant legal sources for the right to freedom of assembly: 
the Constitution and the Public Assembly Act. Article 47 of the Constitution provides: 
“Everyone has the right, without prior permission, to assemble peacefully and to 
conduct meetings. This right may be restricted in the cases and pursuant to procedure 
provided by law to ensure national security, public order, morals, traffic safety, and the 
safety of participants in a meeting, or to prevent the spread of an infectious disease.” 
The Public Assembly Act provides the specific regulation in regards to the right to 
freedom of assembly.  
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(2) As referred, the Constitution determines the right to freedom of assembly as 
“everyone‟s” right and thus, meets the international standard. However, the Public 
Assembly Act stipulates that the organizer of an assembly needs to be an adult with 
full legal capacity and holding Estonian citizenship or long-term or permanent 
residence permit (Article 6 (4)). For participants of an assembly there are no 
limitations. In some cases however, the restriction from Article 6 (4) can become an 
obstacle for person‟s exercise of the right. Therefore, the international standard is not 
fully met.  
 
(3) According to Article 7 of the Public Assembly Act there is an obligation to notify the 
local government or the police prior to the assembly. This must be done no later than 4 
working days before the assembly takes place, but it applies only to assemblies that 
require reorganisation of traffic, erecting a tent, a stage, a stand or any other large-scale 
construction or use of audio equipment or lighting installations. For all other 
assemblies – also spontaneous assemblies – the law provides that the police should be 
notified at least 2 hours prior to the assembly. Further, this can be done also via phone. 
The four-day-restriction does not affect that because it is not likely that a person would 
like to hold a spontaneous assembly within the next 4 hours and would also want to 
build a large-scale stage for that. Thus, it can be inferred that the international standard 
is met.  
 
(4) The notion of peacefulness is first noted by the Constitution Article 47, but also 
emphasized in several articles of the Public Assembly Act. Article 1 sets out that the 
aim of the act is to guarantee persons‟ right to peacefully assemble, Article 11 provides 
that the organizer of the assembly should guarantee that the assembly is performed 
peacefully, and Article 13 stipulates that the participants have the obligation to act 
peacefully. Thus, international standard has been addressed.  
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(5) Article 2 of the Public Assembly Act provides that “an assembly is a meeting, 
demonstration, rally, picket, religious event, procession, or other manifestation 
conducted on a square; in a park; or on a road, street, or in another public place in open 
air”.130 Would the assembly definition  provided by the Estonian domestic regulation 
subsume the “new forms” of assemblies? The author of this paper would claim that 
most likely it would,  as “other manifestation” is not entirely fixed in its meaning. 
Therefore, new forms of assemblies would be protected as well and the standard is 
met.  
 
3.2.2 Georgia131 
 
(1) For domestic assembly regulation in Georgia there are two legal sources relevant: the 
Constitution of Georgia and the Law on Assemblage and Manifestations of the 
Republic of Georgia (LAM). Article 25 of the Constitution sets out that: “Everyone, 
except members of the armed forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs, has the right to 
public assembly without arms either indoors or outdoors without prior permission.  
[…]”.  
 
(2) The Georgian Constitution provides that the right to freedom of assembly is guaranteed 
for everyone with the exception of members of the armed forces and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. However, Article 3 of the LAM stipulates that “assemblage means a 
gathering of a group of citizens […]” as if the participants of an assemblage could be 
only citizens. On the other hand, “manifestation” is defined as “a public demonstration, 
mass public rally, or a march in the street to express solidarity or protest as well as a 
                                                 
130
 Estonia country profile. 
131
 A very recent report has a short insight into assembly practices in Georgia. Although this is 
beyond the scope of the analysis of this paper, it offers an interesting background information. 
International Federation for Human Rights, Steadfast in Protest - Annual Report 2011 - 
Georgia, pp. 456-457.  
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march with the use of posters, slogans, banners, and other visual tools” with no 
reference to citizen status. Some assemblies require previous notification and if so, an 
organizer of the assembly will be appointed. According to Article 5 (2) of the LAM 
“citizens under 18 years of age and persons who are not citizens of Georgia shall not 
have a right to act as such responsible persons”. And also in case of assemblies that do 
not require notification, the text of the LAM refers to citizens only – Article 7 sets out 
“the rule of mandatory notification does not apply to regular citizens […]“. Thus, the 
international standard is not addressed.  
 
(3) According to LAM there seems to be a possibility to hold a spontaneous assembly. 
First, according to Article 6 (1) “a local government body has a right to determine a 
permanent place and time for holding assemblages about which no preliminary 
warning notice has been made“. Further, Article 7 states that “the rule of mandatory 
notification does not apply to regular citizens who would like to express their opinion 
by means of posters, slogans, banners, and other visible tools; however, they may not 
use entrances and stairs of buildings, block roads or hinder the movement of transport 
and pedestrians”. However, as the local government only has a right and not an 
obligation to determine the permanent place for holding assemblages with no 
preliminary warning, it is possible that this right will not be used. Overall it seems that 
although there is a possibility to hold an assembly with no pre-notice, this is quite 
restricted and thus we could argue that the international standard is not met to full 
extent.   
 
(4) The LAM does not use the common word “peaceful” in regards to assembly activities, 
but nevertheless it stems from the provisions that the activities should be non-violent in 
nature. For example, Article 1 (1) of the LAM provides that the aim of the LAM is to 
“govern relations arising from exercise of the Constitutional right to assemble […] 
without arms […]”, and Article 11 (3) (a) stipulates that the “participants of an 
assemblage or manifestation shall be prohibited: to have arms, explosives, 
inflammables, tear gas, radioactive, paralyzing and poisonous substances […]”. Thus, 
 46 
 
in principle the international standard is met because the idea that participants should 
be non-violent is addressed.  
 
(5) If we once again turn to the definitions of assemblage and manifestation, it can be 
concluded that the definition (“a gathering of a group of citizens indoors or outdoors or 
a public meeting to express solidarity or protest”) is general enough to allow the 
application of the regulation also to some new, unusual forms of assemblies.  
3.2.3 Germany  
 
(1) There are three relevant legal sources for the right to freedom of assembly in Germany. 
First the Constitution of Germany provides that “all Germans shall have the right to 
assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission” (Article 8 
(1) ) and “in case of outdoor assemblies, this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a 
law (Article 8 (1)). Further, there is the general Assembly Act that sets out the details 
of the right. As Germany is a federal state, it consists of 16 partly independent states 
and since the administrative reform in 2006 the states have the right to use a local 
assembly regulation. However, until they have not done that, the general Assembly Act 
applies.
132
 With this paper we will only look at the standard set by the Constitution and 
Assembly Act.  
 
(2) As seen from the Article 8 of the Constitution, the right to assemble peacefully is 
guaranteed for “all Germans” which makes the provision narrower than what the 
international standard would require. However, the Assembly Act itself provides in 
Article 1 (1) that “Jedermann” has the right to freedom of assembly and “Jedermann” 
is German for “everyone”. Thus, if we consider the lex specialis here, the international 
standard in regard to the subjects of the right is met.  
 
                                                 
132
 Versammlungsrecht. Bundesministerium des Innern.   
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(3) The possibility to hold spontaneous assemblies is the closest addressed with Article 14 
of the Assembly Act in which it is stated that a person who wants to hold a public 
assembly should inform the relevant authority at least 48 hours before the assembly. It 
depends on what is the threshold, but the author of this paper would argue that the 
requirement of 48 hours should not be universal for all assemblies. Rather should the 
regulation also allow assemblies with no prior notification at all. Thus, to conclude, the 
international standard is not entirely met here.  
 
(4) The requirement of peacefulness is entailed both in the Constitution and in the Public 
Assembly Act: the former uses explicitly the word “friedlich” which means peacefully 
and the latter refers that the participants should not carry weapons (Article 2). 
Therefore, the international standard is met.  
 
(5) Neither of the two sources deal with the definition of an assembly and thus, it is 
impossible to analyse whether the Assembly Act would apply to the “new forms” of 
assembly.  
 
3.2.4 Russia133 
 
(1) The relevant domestic assembly law sources for Russia are the Constitution and the 
Federal Law No. 54-FZ of June 19,2004 on Rallies, Meetings, Demonstrations and 
Picketing. Article 31 of the Constitution provides that: “Citizens of the Russian 
Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, 
meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.” The Federal Law has 19 articles 
which add specifications to Article 31 of the Constitution.  
                                                 
133 A very recent report has a short insight into assembly practices in Russia. Although this is 
beyond the scope of the analysis of this paper, it offers an interesting background information. 
International Federation for Human Rights, Steadfast in Protest - Annual Report 2011 - 
Russian Federation, pp. 478-480.  
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(2) The departure point for determining the subjects of the right according to Russian 
domestic regulation is Article 31 of the Constitution that appears to be similar to the 
corresponding article in German Constitution.. Article 31 provides that the “citizens of 
the Russian Federation” have the right to assemble. This provision makes the right to 
freedom of assembly dependant on citizenship which does not accord to the 
international standard. Although Article 2 of the Federal Law provides that a public 
event (a rally, meeting, demonstration, march, picketing or a combination of those 
forms) is accessible to everyone, it has to be “undertaken at the initiative of citizens of 
the Russian Federation […]” and the remainder of the provisions in the Federal Law 
also refer to citizens (see e.g. articles 5, 6). Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
international standard is not addressed here properly.
134
 
 
(3) The possibility to hold spontaneous assemblies is not available under Russian domestic 
assembly regulation.
135
 It stems from the Federal Law that all assemblies need prior 
notification and according to Article 7 (1) “a notice of holding the public event […] 
shall be sent […] not later than ten days prior to holding of the public event. In case of 
holding a picketing by a group of persons, a notice of holding the public event may be 
submitted within the period not later than three days prior to the holding of same.” 
Thus, the international standard has not been addressed.  
 
                                                 
134 Interestingly, Article 1 of the Federal Law provides that the Federal Law is among other 
domestic regulations also based on “the commonly recognized principles and norms of 
international law, international agreements of the Russian Federation”. 
135
 A recent document (30 September 2011) “Comments of the Russian Federation on the 
letter of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Thomas Hammarberg, on 
ensuring the right to freedom of assembly in the Russian Federation of 21 July, 2011” is 
available.  
 49 
 
(4) The requirement of peacefulness is entailed in the Constitution Article 31 (see before) 
and in the Federal Law: the preamble refers to “peaceful assembly without weapons” 
and Article 2 (1) to “peaceful action”. Thus, the standard is met.  
 
(5) The question of “new forms” finding the protection of the assembly regulation is 
probably best answered if we look at the Federal Law as a whole. It seems that the 
drafters have had an intent to leave the scope of what is an assembly rather wide by 
acknowledging that “various combinations“ of meetings, rallies, marches etc. can 
occur. Thus, should a political flash mob take place it is likely to be seen as an 
assembly. However, as seen before, the essence of a flash mob is its spontaneity and 
this would not be compatible with the Russian assembly regulation not enabling 
spontaneous assemblies. But if we evaluate whether the regulation offers wider 
definition of an assembly and is “open” to new assemblies by definition, then we can 
infer that the international standard is met.  
3.2.5 Sweden  
 
(1) The domestic legal sources relevant for Swedish assembly regulation are the 
Constitution, the Penal Code, Public Order Act and Police Act. Article 1 (3) in chapter 
2 of the Instrument of Government of the Constitution provides: “Everyone shall be 
guaranteed […] the freedom of assembly: that is, the freedom to organise or attend 
meetings for the purposes of information or the expression of opinion or for any other 
similar purpose, or for the purpose of presenting artistic work”.  
 
(2) The subjects of the right have not been specified. The Public Order Act uses passive 
voice or remains neutral. In addition, the wording of the Constitution refers to 
“everyone” which allows to infer that the domestic assembly regulation addresses the 
international standard.  
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(3) According to the Public Order Act articles 4 and 5 there must be a permission for an 
assembly unless given the expected number of participants, the chosen place and time 
of meeting, and the devices referred to occur would take place without danger to public 
order and safety or traffic. In this case only a notification is required. According to 
Article 6 for permission the time frame is no later than one week before the meeting 
and the application for permission must be done in written form. Notification can be 
made in writing or orally and “if possible,  notification shall be received no later than 
five days before the meeting or event”. A notification is not required if again no threat 
would occur for public order, safety and traffic. Thus, if well reasoned, there is the 
possibility of a spontaneous assembly and the international standard is met.  
 
(4) The Public Order Act and the Constitution neither use the wording of “peaceful 
assembly” nor an equivalent. It is not justified to automatically conclude that the 
international standard is not met because not including the peacefulness- “restriction” 
could also mean a larger protection. Further, the fact that participants should not be 
violent might be regulated also with other laws, e.g. criminal law. Thus, it is the 
opinion of the author that the international standard is met here.  
 
(5) Chapter 2, Article 1 (5) of the Public Order Act provides that a public assembly is 
additionally also “other assembly where the freedom of assembly is exercised” which 
allows a wider interpretation and would also protect a “new form” of an assembly if 
needed. This means an alignment with the international standard.  
 
3.3 Conclusion of Chapter 3: What are the overall tendencies that the selected 
countries propose?  
 
Here, the outcome of investigating five countries will be summarised. As a comparison, the 
results will be compared to the data provided by the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human 
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Rights Dataset.
136
 This variable indicates the extent to which the freedoms of assembly and 
association are subject to actual governmental limitations or restrictions (as opposed to strictly 
legal protections). A score of 0 indicates that citizens‟ rights to freedom of assembly or 
association were severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens; a score of 1 indicates 
that these rights were limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for select groups; 
and a score of 2 indicates that these rights were virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by 
practically all citizens in a given year. Although this variable combines the right to freedom of 
assembly with the right to freedom of association, it will still offer an interesting comparison 
because although this paper is narrowed down to address some of the issues of the right to 
freedom of assembly in a certain context, the specific problems are usually mirroring the 
overall human rights status. 
 
The Table No. 1 summarises the answers to the questions 2-5 for each country in a simple 
format: if according to the analysis the international standard was addressed in the domestic 
assembly regulation, a score of 1 is given, and if the international standard was not met, a 
score of 0 is given, if the analysis could not result in an answer, “no answer” is applied. The 
last column is the variable that country scored in the CIRI HR Dataset.  
 
Country  
Subjects  
of the right (2) 
Spontaneous  
assemblies (3) 
Peacefulness 
(4) 
New 
forms (5) 
Total 
score 
CIRI 
HR 
Dataset 
variable  
Estonia  0 1 1 1 3 2 
Georgia  0 0 1 1 2 0 
Germany 1 0 1 No 
answer 
2 1 
Russia 0 0 1 1 2 0 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 4 2 
 
 Table No. 1: Summary of the analysis 
                                                 
136
 The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. 
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As seen from the Table No. 1, only one of the five countries – Sweden – scored a maximum 
score of 4 in addressing the international standard in every question. For Germany, Georgia 
and Russia, the total score was 2, whereas Estonia scored a 3. However, for Germany it must 
be noted that the question number 5 was scored as “no answer”.  It stems from the Table that 
the most problematic was the question of subjects of the right to freedom of assembly – only 2 
(Sweden and Germany) countries out of 5 could meet the international standard with the 
domestic regulation. Problematic is also the possibility to hold spontaneous assemblies – only 
2 (Sweden and Estonia) met the standard.  
The least problematic was the question of peacefulness – all 5 countries out of 5 managed to 
address the international standard.  
 
 
Graph No. 2: How do the selected countries meet the international standard? 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Estonia Georgia Germany Russia Sweden 
How do the selected countries meet the 
international standard? 
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Graph No. 3: CIRI Human Rights Dataset scores 
 
If we compare the two graphs, we see that for Estonia and Sweden the placement is very 
similar: in Graph No. 3 they score the highest, and in Graph No. 2 Sweden scores the highest 
and Estonia the second highest.  For other countries there are some differences as in Graph 
No. 2 Germany, Georgia and Russia are all in the same category, but in Graph No. 3 Georgia 
and Russia score a 0. Why? There might be many reasons. First it might be that the method 
used for this thesis is too narrow and straightforward because even when we look at the 
analysis of the regulations, we encounter many assumptions and “possible scenarios”. Another 
reason is very technical: language. It is also possible that what is meant by the regulations 
suffers through the translation. Lastly, the author of this paper only used a selection of issues 
and questions to evaluate the compliance of the international standard.  
 
If we look at the presented table and Graph No. 2, it would be easy to make conclusions that 
by and large the domestic regulations of the selected countries do address the international 
standard of the right to freedom of assembly as none of them scored a 0 and 3 out of 5 scored 
an average 2 . But the author of this paper would like to argue that this is too easy of an 
approach. There are two concerns we should address and keep in mind. Firstly, that only 5 
countries were looked at and among those 5 were at least three (Estonia, Germany, Sweden) 
that we consider strong democracies with no remarkable human rights violations. Thus, if 
already in this group we discovered gaps in addressing the international standard, this should 
0 
1 
2 
Estonia Georgia Germany Russia Sweden 
CIRI HR Dataset scores 
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be a concern. Secondly, it is important to acknowledge where those gaps appeared. Bearing 
also in mind that the 4 questions (aspects) chosen were already regarded as essential and up-
to-date for the right to freedom of assembly. The most problematic was the question of 
subjects of the right. The author of this paper would argue that the incompatibility there is not 
just a gap that could be treated light-heartedly, but a signal that there is something wrong with 
the fundamental understandings and perceptions of the right to freedom of assembly. Also, 3 
domestic regulations of countries investigated did not address properly the international 
standard for the spontaneous assemblies which is again a very problematic. Therefore, the 
argument of this paper would be that the selected countries in Europe are not properly 
addressing the problematic aspects of the right to freedom of assembly in the light of the 
international standard.  
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Conclusion 
 
The research question of the thesis was: “How are the domestic regulations of the selected 
countries in Europe  able to address the developments and potential problems of the right to 
freedom of assembly in the light of the international standard of the right to freedom of 
assembly?” For establishing an answer to that question the paper was divided into three 
connected chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 asked what is the right to freedom of assembly in order to properly define the object 
of the paper. It was found in Chapter 1 that although closely interrelated with other rights – 
such as the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association – , the right to freedom of 
assembly has some distinctive elements and carries an independent value as a human right. 
The main contribution of Chapter 1 was the summary of the analysis in a form of a model 
(Graph No. 1) that proposed the relations between the right to freedom of assembly, speech 
and association and thus, the elements of the right. It was established that the right to freedom 
of assembly elements are group, temporariness, act, public forum, content/agenda and intent. 
This model with its analysed elements was directly or indirectly used throughout the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 moved forward with the investigation and asked for the international standard and 
the problematic issues of the right to freedom of assembly. It was established that the relevant 
sources for the international standard for the right are UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and Guidelines 
(2010). It was investigated what the international standard set for the issues concerning the 
subjects of the right, criterion of peacefulness, spontaneous assemblies and new forms of 
assemblies. Shortly put, it was found that according to the international standard the right to 
freedom of assembly is everyone‟s right, only peaceful assembly activities are protected, the 
importance of spontaneous assemblies is higher than ever due to the technological 
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development and definitions of assemblies should address and thus protect also new forms of 
assemblies if applicable. Additionally, it was the argument of the author that in regards to the 
international standard of the right to freedom of assembly, a legal source that would offer 
more official guidance, detailed specific standards is missing.  
 
In Chapter 3 the relevant provisions of the domestic assembly regulations of five countries – 
Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Russia, Sweden – were put against the international standard. The 
subjects of the right, spontaneous assemblies, peacefulness and new forms of assemblies were 
analysed. The results of that investigation were presented in a table (Table No. 1) and 
compared against another research (Graph No. 2 and No. 3). In summary it was found that 
although according to the overall numbers the selected countries addressed some of the issues 
analysed according to the international standard, the gaps appeared in very important 
questions – the subjects of the right, and possibility to hold a spontaneous assemblies. Thus, it 
can be concluded that within the restricted scope of this thesis the countries do not wholly 
address the international standard. Also, the investigation of the international standard of the 
right to freedom of assembly lets us infer that there are gaps within the standard itself as well. 
Meaning, that at times, the international standard itself is not up-to-date, instructive and 
straightforward enough. Of course, “good laws, by themselves, cannot mechanically generate 
improvements in practice”,137 but the author of this paper would argue that firstly, “good laws” 
that manage to address the international standard form a basis for “good practices”, and 
secondly, “good laws” that address the international standard allow the rights-holders to rely 
on the law provisions in case of a violation of human rights.  
 
In addition to the analysis and answer of the research question this paper has three additional 
contributions. Firstly, this thesis searched for all the relevant material and legal sources 
available for the right to freedom of assembly and put it all into one bigger context to 
demonstrate the relations and shortcomings. As a future implication and further development 
of this work, other countries/regions and the domestic case-law should be looked at 
                                                 
137
 Guidelines (2010), p. 9.  
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additionally. Furthermore, the research conducted by the author demonstrated that although 
the database LegislatiOnline.org is a vital contribution, it is neither perfect nor exhaustive: for 
many countries the translations of relevant assembly regulations are missing. Therefore, also 
this database should receive resources in order to provide sufficient information for further 
legal analysis.  
 
Secondly, this thesis offered one model understanding of what is the right to freedom of 
assembly in the form of a fairly simple graph that could be used also in the future in practice, 
or academia. If discussed and, if necessary, amended by also other scholars, this could be used 
as a common basis of understanding of the right to freedom of assembly.  
 
Thirdly, last but not least, this paper aims to fuel further general or specific legal discussions 
and debates on the subject of the right to freedom of assembly in order to put it back on the 
legal academic agenda. Not only would it be the interest of the author of this paper to see other 
authors expressing their assent or dissent, but it would benefit the work of the newly appointed 
SR and, above all – the rights-holders of the right to freedom of assembly. 
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